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Abstract
The authors study interaction on a two-lane road between the trips of two types of drivers
who differ by their desired speeds. The difference in desired speeds causes congestion,
because slow vehicles force fast vehicles to reduce their speed. Results for this type of
congestion with respect to tolling are very different from those of the classic Pigou±Knight
model, where the marginal external costs are an increasing function of the number of road
users. In our model we find the opposite result: the marginal external costs of slow vehicles
are a decreasing function of the number of slow vehicles. This leads to rather different
policy recommendations.
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Introduction
In this paper we study what may be considered to be the most elementary
form of tra¤c congestion: vehicles that are unable to maintain the desired
speed because of slower tra¤c in front of them. This form of congestion is
well known to each car driver. It is also relatively easy to model in a
structural way, because the causal relations involved are simple. Many
other models of congestion (the bottleneck model of Arnott et al. (1993) is
an important exception) use a relationship between demand (or tra¤c ¯ow
or density) and travel time (or speed) of a reduced form character, usually
the ‘‘fundamental diagram.’’ We prefer to model the mechanism that leads
to congestion explicitly. This implies that the impacts of slow vehicles on
fast vehicles have to be modelled.
Tzedakis (1980) is, as far as we know, the ®rst study of congestion
caused by diVerent vehicle speeds.1 His study refers to a single lane
where tra¤c enters with stochastic arrival times. In Verhoef, Rouwendal
and Rietveld (1999) we studied congestion caused by speed diVerences
without overtaking in a situation with deterministic arrival times.2
Although deterministic arrival times have some advantages for elabor-
ating the model, the realism of this assumption is, of course, question-
able. Even for rail tra¤c with a ®xed schedule of trains, there are
random delays. Huisman and Boucherie (2001) have recently studied the
implications of this for actual running times on railway sections with
two types of trains (with diVerent speeds for each type), although with
diVerent methods from those we adopt here. We have not been able to
®nd something like an economic analysis of overtaking on two-lane
roads. We have only one example of a study on platoon formation on
two-lane roads, Barzily and Rubinovitch (1979) who develop a model in
which road sections where overtaking is either completely unrestricted or
impossible alternate. In fact they model the situation as a three-lane
highway in which the lane in the middle is divided into sections that are
alternately reserved for tra¤c in both directions. This study does not
give an economic analysis of the congestion implied by platoon for-
mation.
Newell (1998) has studied the eVects of a ‘‘moving bottleneck’’; that
is, of a slow vehicle on a road used by vehicles that drive faster. His
1Wardrop’s (1952) classic paper discusses speed diVerences and the associated necessity of
frequent overtaking. It suggests using the ratio of actual to desired overtakings as a
measure of congestion, but does not analyse this type of congestion itself.
2A comparison between the results of that paper and those obtained in the present is
provided at the end of the next section.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 36, Part 3
408
analysis diVers from ours in that he considers a situation in which two
lanes are available for tra¤c moving in a single direction, so that over-
taking is always possible. Moreover, he concentrates on the eVects of the
higher density of fast vehicles on the lane used for overtaking the slow
vehicle on the average speed of the fast vehicles, whereas we will assume
that cars will have constant speeds independent of tra¤c density, unless
the distance to its immediate predecessor becomes smaller than a
threshold value. We will return to Newell’s analysis in the ®nal section of
this paper.
In this paper we study tra¤c on a road used by two types of vehicles
that are identi®ed by their desired speeds. Slow vehicles have a lower
desired speed than fast vehicles and the presence of the former type of
vehicle causes congestion for the latter type. The extent of congestion in
this context, and various policy measures to deal with it, are the subject of
this paper.
The situation studied in the paper is a two-lane road with cars driving
in both directions. It is assumed that the same types of vehicle are present
on both lanes, although possibly in diVerent numbers.
We start our analysis by considering the situation in which overtaking
is impossible or prohibited and introduce the possibility of overtaking
later on. It will be argued in the sections that follow that tolling is hardly a
useful policy for tra¤c control under these circumstances and that other
measures (such as prohibiting slow vehicles to enter some roads) should be
considered instead.
An obvious, but costly, possibility to relieve congestion problems of the
type considered here would be to make a second lane available for tra¤c
in each direction. Except for very high levels of tra¤c demand, all con-
gestion will then disappear if there are only two types of vehicles. In reality
the second lane is often the one used by the tra¤c proceeding in the
opposite direction, and this implies that it is only available for overtaking
if su¤ciently large gaps occur in oncoming tra¤c. This situation is studied
in the second part of the paper.
Throughout the paper we refer to vehicles as the actors that determine
the tra¤c phenomena in which we are interested. The term vehicle should
be interpreted as referring to the vehicle as well as to its driver, while the
latter is usually not mentioned explicitly for the sake of brevity. By
adopting this convention we attempt to bring out clearly that tra¤c is not
only determined by drivers’ characteristics, but also by vehicles’ perfor-
mances. For instance, a truck driver may have a very high desired speed,
but be unable to reach it because of the characteristics of the vehicle. In
such a case the truck may have a speed that is lower than that of other cars
and will be referred to as a slow vehicle.
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Overtaking Impossible or Prohibited
Preliminaries
We consider tra¤c on a road segment of ®nite, but arbitrary, length l. This
road segment has two lanes and tra¤c moving in opposite directions.
Overtaking may either be prohibited or impossible (for example, because
the lanes are physically separated). The next section will consider the
situation in which overtaking is possible if tra¤c on the other lane allows a
driver to do so. In the present section attention may be limited to vehicles
on a single lane.
There are two types of vehicles on the road: those belonging to the
®rst group have a preferred speed s1 and those belonging to the second
group a preferred speed s2. We assume that s1 > s2 and will often refer to
vehicles in the ®rst group as ‘‘fast’’ and to vehicles in the second as
‘‘slow.’’ We assume that both types of vehicle choose their preferred
speeds unless the circumstances on the road force them to reduce it. In
general one would expect speeds to be chosen endogenously on the basis
of travel conditions. In situations without congestion vehicles have a
preferred speed that depends on the conditions of the road. Our analysis
assumes homogeneous travel conditions, and hence a constant speed for
both types of vehicle. Since there are only two types of vehicle, slow
vehicles can always use their preferred speeds and it seems natural to
assume that they will do so.3 For fast vehicles the situation is somewhat
diVerent. If they anticipate the necessity to slow down because of a slow
driver in front of them, they may decide to slow down gradually instead
of maintaining their own preferred speed as long as possible. However,
even though incorporating this behaviour into our model may result in a
more realistic picture of actual tra¤c, it will not change the results about
congestion as long as the fast vehicles are as close as possible behind the
slow vehicles when leaving the road segment that we study.4 The total
travel time of fast vehicles does not depend on the way they reduce their
speed when they are forced to reduce speed because of a slow vehicle in
front of them.
3If the risk of accidents in¯uences the preferred speed, one can imagine that the presence of
fast vehicles will reduce their speed even more. However, this may increase the risk of
accidents and a more rational reaction may be that slow vehicles increase their preferred
speed. Since an analysis of this issue would take us too far from the scope of the present
paper, we assume a preferred speed that is independent of tra¤c conditions.
4Fast vehicles have an incentive to do so if the end of the road segment coincides with a
junction, or a possibility for overtaking that would give them an opportunity to return to
their higher preferred speed.
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Demand for trips on the road segment, expressed in the number of cars
per time unit, will be denoted as mi, i 1; 2. The costs associated with a
trip consist of expected travel time wi and possibly a toll zi. It seems
natural to assume that for both types of vehicles demand is a decreasing
function of the generalised travel cost, that is, the sum of the monetary
value of expected travel time wi and a possible toll zi. The inverse demand
function gi, i 1; 2 can then be written as:
gi mi viwi zi; i 1; 2: 1
where vi is group i ’s valuation of travel time, which is assumed to be a
strictly positive number.
In this section we consider the situation in which tra¤c is restricted to a
single lane. As soon as a fast driver is forced to slow down, he drives at the
low speed of his leader until the end of the road segment.
The demand functions will be used to derive optimal tolls, but before
we are able to do this, we ®rst have to consider how travel times are related
to demand.
Minimum distance
We assume that a minimum distance d must be maintained between the
fronts of subsequent cars on the same road. If the distance between two
subsequent cars becomes equal to d the follower will reduce its speed to
that of the leader. In the situations to be considered in this paper, the close
proximity of a slow driver in front of a fast driver is the only reason why
fast vehicles reduce speed. Slow vehicles are always able to maintain their
preferred speed.
Capacity of the road
If car A enters the road segment, a following car, car B, can enter only
after car A has moved d metres on the road segment. If car A has a
slow driver, this takes d =s2 time units, if it has a fast driver d =s1
units. In order to keep the presentation simple, we assume that always
d =s2 seconds pass before another car enters the road segment.
5 The
5Robin Lindsey informed us that the California Uniform Vehicle Code stipulates that
vehicles maintain a two-second headway behind the vehicle ahead of them. This would
justify our assumption.
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maximum capacity c of the road segment, de®ned in this way, is
therefore equal to:
c 1= d =s2
s2=d : 2
It is assumed throughout the paper that the demand for trips does not
exceed the capacity of the road.
Arrivals
During the ®rst d =s2 seconds after entrance of a car, the arrival rate
equals 0, but otherwise it takes on the constant value l.6 The density
function of the additional time t until arrival of the next car is therefore
f t l exp lt , with expectation 1=l. l is the sum of the arrival rates
of fast and slow cars, denoted as l1 and l2.
The arrival rates li are of course related to demand mi. In fact the
arrival rates would be equal to the demand volumes if the requirement of a
minimum time between the arrival of subsequent cars had not been made.
Because cars cannot enter arbitrarily soon after each other, the expected
number of cars entering the road segment is smaller than l1 l2, implying
that the arrival rate must be higher than m1 m2.
In order to derive the relationship between arrival rates and demand,
we set demand equal to the expected number of arrivals. The expected
value of the time that elapses between the entrance of subsequent vehicles
is d =s2 1=l, and the expected number of vehicles E n that enter during
one time unit is therefore equal to E n l= ld =s2 1 .
In order to make this number equal to m1 m2, l should be equal to:
l
m1 m2
1 m1 m2 =c
: 3
If the capacity of the road is large, l will be close to m1 m2, as one should
expect.
For each car that enters the road there is ®xed probability
p m1= m1 m2 that it is fast, and a complementary probability 1 p
that it is slow. The arrival rates of both types of vehicles are therefore:
li
mi
1 m1 m2
¡ ¢
=c
i 1; 2: 4
6Alternatively, we could have assumed a constant arrival rate, in combination with the
possible existence of a queue on the on ramp. This would complicate our derivations, but
would probably not change the results. We have therefore adopted the simpler approach.
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Travel times
The main interest of this paper is in congestion, and therefore in the time
needed to travel across the road segment. For a slow driver this time is
always equal to:
w2
l
s2
: 5
Clearly, slow vehicles do not experience congestion. Fast vehicles may
experience congestion because of the presence of slow vehicles on the road
segment at the time they travel it. Since a stochastic process determines the
arrivals of both fast and slow vehicles, travel time for the fast vehicles is a
random variable. It is shown in the Appendix that its expected value is
equal to:
w1
l
s2
1
l2
1 exp l2
l
s2
l
s1
³ ´³ ´³ ´
: 6
It is immediately clear from this formula that expected travel time for the
fast vehicles is at most equal to l=s2, the travel time for the slow vehicles. It
will, of course, only reach this limit if every fast driver is forced to slow
down to the lower speed immediately after entering the road. This happens
when l2 becomes very large and the second term on the right hand side of
the formula vanishes.
It follows also from the formula that expected travel time approaches
its upper bound l=s2 1=l2 if the length of the road becomes very large.
The reason is that on a very long road a fast car will usually be forced to
slow down by a slow car when a small part of the road has been travelled.
(This small part may, of course, be a large number of kilometres.)
Although it is not obvious from the formula, it can be shown (see the
Appendix) that for l2 0 expected travel time for fast vehicles becomes
equal to l=s1, the travel time of fast vehicles who experience no congestion,
as should be expected.
Expected travel time is an increasing function of the arrival rate l2 as
should also be expected. However, as shown in the Appendix, travel time
is a concave function of the arrival rate. This is worthy to be stressed, since
it has important consequences for tolling. The economic analysis of tra¤c
congestion in the tradition of Pigou and Knight assumes a convex relation
between tra¤c demand and travel time.
It is also noteworthy that the arrival rate for fast vehicles, l1, does not
appear in the formula for the travel times of these vehicles. Neither the
travel time of the fast vehicles nor that of the slow vehicles depends on the
arrival rate of fast vehicles. This suggests that optimal tolling would
require a toll for slow vehicles only. Although it will be shown below that
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this is actually not completely true, it is usually a good approximation to
the truth.
Demand and travel time
Substitution of equation (4) (for i 2) into (6) gives the desired relation
between the travel time of fast vehicles and demands:
w1
l
s2
1 m1 m2 =c
m2
1 exp
m2
1 m1 m2 =c
l
s2
l
s1
³ ´³ ´³ ´
: 7
It is clear from this formula that the travel time of fast cars on the road
segment depends on the demand for trips of slow vehicles as well as on that
of fast vehicles.
If total demand approaches the capacity c, both arrival rates l1 and l2
will become very large and the expected travel time close to its maximum
value l=s2.
Optimal tolls
Optimal tolls can be derived by maximising the social surplus, that is, the
sum of the consumer surpluses of both types of vehicle and the toll rev-
enues under appropriate side conditions (see the Appendix, where the
possibility of boundary solutions is also discussed). If an interior solution
is relevant, the optimal tolls satisfy the following equations:
z1 m1v1
@w1
@m1
;
z2 m1v1
@w1
@m2
:
8
These formulas are not too surprising, but their elaboration is more
interesting. For the purpose of computing the optimal tolls it is more
convenient to use the alternative, but equivalent formulas that start from
equation (6) instead of (7) and use the chain rule to complete the deri-
vation:
z1 m1v1
@w1
@l2
@l2
@m1
;
z2 m1v1
@w1
@l2
@l2
@m2
:
9
For positive demands of both types of vehicles, all partial derivatives
appearing in equation (9) are positive, and so are the tolls.
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Further elaboration allows one to write the optimal tolls as:
z1 v1
m1
m2
1
c
1 1
m2
1
m1 m2
c
l
s2
l
s1
³ ´0B@
1CA
0B@
exp
m2
1
m1 m2
c
l
s2
l
s1
³ ´0B@
1CA
1CA 10
z2 z1 1
c m1 m2
¡ ¢
m2
³ ´
:
From the way these equations are written down, it is clear that the toll for
slow vehicles is always higher than that for fast vehicles. The diVerence will
be small if demand for trips by slow vehicles is large, and the diVerence will
be large if demand for trips by slow vehicles is small. In particular, it can
be shown that:
limm2 0 z1 0 if m1 > 0;
limm2 0 z2 if m1 > 0:
11
This implies an inverse relationship between the level of the congestion toll
for slow vehicles and the level of congestion itself, which is at variance
with the results from the Pigou±Knight analysis. The reason for the
inverse relationship is the fact that a fast driver who is forced to slow down
by a slow driver is, from that moment on, insensitive to the presence of
more slow vehicles on the road. Additional slow vehicles can only hinder
fast vehicles who are not already forced to slow down by the presence of
the slow vehicles already using the road. Since the number of ‘‘free ¯ow-
ing’’ fast vehicles is a decreasing function of the number of slow vehicles,
the additional congestion caused by an extra slow driver will decrease. An
example will clarify this.
Illustration
Consider a road with a length of 10 kilometres where fast vehicles want to
drive at 80 kilometres per hour, and slow vehicles at 60 kilometres per
hour. The minimum required distance between (the noses of) subsequent
vehicles is 20 metres, which implies that capacity equals 3,000 cars per
hour. Such a road may be thought of as one connecting two villages in a
rural area. If overtaking is impossible or prohibited on that road, expected
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travel time for fast vehicles is given by equation (6). The travel time for
slow cars on this road is equal to 10 minutes (0.166 hours).
Figure 1 shows the relations between the travel time of fast vehicles and
the volume of their demand for trips on the road. The lowest line in that
®gure refers to a situation in which the demand for trips by slow vehicles is
very low: 1 car per hour. The ®gure shows that in that case the curve is
similar to the ones usually presented in the Pigou±Knight analysis of
congestion. Travel time is close to its minimum value unless the number of
fast vehicles approaches the capacity su¤ciently closely.
The ®gure also shows that this relationship changes remarkably for
even moderately high levels of demand for trips by slow vehicles. Travel
time of fast vehicles becomes an almost linear function of their demand for
trips that ¯attens out for higher levels of demand by slow vehicles. This
suggests that it will be interesting to look also to the relationship between
the travel time of fast vehicles and the demand for trips by slow vehicles.
Figure 2 depicts that relation. One line in the picture refers to a
situation in which demand of fast vehicles is very low (10 drivers per hour),
and demand by slow vehicles can vary over almost the full range from 0 to
3,000. The ®gure shows that travel time of fast vehicles is, in this case, a
steeply increasing function of the demand by slow vehicles as long as this
Figure 1
The relationship between the number of fast vehicles and their travel time for various numbers of slow
drivers
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demand is small. For higher volumes of demand by slow vehicles, travel
time of fast vehicles is almost equal to that of slow vehicles (one sixth of an
hour) and insensitive to further increases in the demand by slow vehicles.
Similar lines can be drawn for other volumes of the demand for trips by
fast vehicles. These other lines are all remarkably similar to the one shown
in the ®gure. The most important diVerence is that they end at an earlier
level of demand by slow vehicles, because of the capacity constraint.
In Figure 2 a second line is drawn that is based on demand by fast vehicles
that equals 1,500. It appears, therefore, from the ®gure that the travel time
of fast vehicles is hardly dependent on the demand for trips by either fast
or slow vehicles, unless the latter demand is small, that is, in the range of
0 to 400 cars per hour. Note the concavity of the lines drawn in the
®gure.
The well known diagram on which the conventional Pigou±Knight
analysis is based is sometimes interpreted as having average travel time on
its vertical axis and the number of vehicles per hour that use the road on
its horizontal axis. This could give the impression that the comparison
between the Pigou±Knight model and the one presented in the present
paper would be facilitated by drawing a diagram that gives the average
travel time of fast and slow vehicles that use the road as a function of their
total number. This is easily done when keeping the fractions of both types
of drivers constant, and the resulting concave lines have shapes that are
Figure 2
The relationship between the number of slow vehicles and the travel time of fast vehicles for various
numbers of fast vehicles
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very similar to those drawn in ®gure 2,7and have therefore not been drawn
separately. However, it should be noted that the fractions of fast and slow
drivers should in reality be expected to depend on the travel time itself. In
particular, one would expect the fraction of fast drivers to be smaller if
travel time is relatively large, unless travel demand by fast vehicles would
be completely inelastic.8 The construction of such a picture would there-
fore require, in the context of the present paper, the development of an
equilibrium analysis.
Figures 3 and 4 show the marginal external costs, expressed in time
units, for fast and slow vehicles as a function of the volume of their demand,
for various levels of the demand by the alternative type of vehicles. The
marginal external costs are equal to the optimal tolls if the corresponding
levels of demand would be the equilibrium levels. Figure 3 shows the pat-
tern that is well known from the Pigou±Knight analysiswhen the number of
slow vehicles is very low (1 driver per hour). For higher volumes of demand
by slow vehicles, optimal tolls for fast vehicles become very small.
Figure 3
The relationship between the number of fast vehicles and their marginal external cost for various numbers
of slow vehicles
7This is explained by the similarity of the curves shown in Figure 5 for diVerent numbers of
fast cars and by the fact that the travel time of slow vehicles is independent of tra¤c
conditions.
8Note that the travel time of slow drivers is assumed to be independent of tra¤c
circumstances.
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The curves drawn in Figure 4 are completely diVerent. They show that
the optimal toll for slow vehicles are a decreasing function of their demand
for trips. The reason for this phenomenon is the concavity of the curves
shown in Figure 2. An additional slow driver increases the travel time of
fast vehicles especially when the number of slow vehicles is still small.
When their number is large, travel time of the fast vehicles is already close
to its maximum, and cannot increase further.
The optimal toll for the ®rst slow vehicles that enter the road is highly
dependent on the volume of the demand for trips by fast vehicles. If this is
very small (1 driver per hour) the optimal toll is negligible (the curve is
indistinguishable from the horizontal axis). However, when demand is
moderately large (50 cars per hour or more) optimal tolls for slow vehicles
can be much larger than those for fast vehicles. Figure 4 shows that it can
be equal to the monetary value of 1 hour if demand by fast vehicles equals
1000 cars per hour, and it can become much higher (more than 10 hours)
for higher levels of demand by fast vehicles.
Discussion
We have just seen that the optimal toll for slow vehicles is a decreasing
function of the volume of their demand for trips (at least for the parameter
Figure 4
The relationship between the number of slow vehicles and their marginal external cost for various numbers
of fast vehicles.
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values that have been used in constructing the ®gures). The toll approaches
zero even for moderate values of demand by slow vehicles (say 200 cars per
hour).
In the Pigou±Knight analysis of tra¤c congestion it is conventional to
regard the curve that gives the price for the trip (including a possible toll)
as similar to the supply curve in the analysis of market equilibrium. The
analogous picture under the present circumstances is shown in Figure 5.
The ®gure shows a linear inverse demand curve that crosses the vertical
axis at 2, implying that the maximum value attached to a trip on the road
segment is the (monetary) equivalent of two hours travel time. The max-
imum number of trips per unit of time demanded by slow vehicles is 250 if
travel costs would be equal to zero. The ®gure also shows the travel time
on the road segment. Without policy measures, the market equilibrium
would be at the point where the demand curve crosses the horizontal line
corresponding to the travel time.
Finally, the picture shows two ‘‘supply’’ curves that give social travel
cost as a function of demand for trips by slow vehicles. The ‘‘supply’’ curve
is simply the sum of the travel time of slow cars and the marginal external
cost. It is assumed that demand for trips of fast vehicles is inelastic and the
®gure shows the supply curve for various levels of this ®xed demand. In
both cases shown the supply curve crosses the demand curve at a point
where the toll is relatively low and demand of slow vehicles is close to what
it would be in a situation without tolling. This situation, which is indicated
in the ®gure as equilibrium (i), is the ®rst candidate for an optimum.
However, more such points can be distinguished.
If the demand for trips of fast vehicles is high, there may be a second
point where the two curves cross. At this point the optimal toll is so high
that demand for trips by slow vehicles is reduced to a very small value.
This situation is indicated in the ®gure as equilibrium (ii). However,
equilibrium (ii) can never be an optimum since the supply curve crosses the
demand curve from above. Situation (ii) therefore refers to a minimum.9
9To see this, consider the eVects of a small change in the number of slow vehicles from
situation (ii) on the social surplus. If the number of slow vehicles increases, their part of
the social surplus,
„
g2 m2 dm2 v2w2·2, certainly increases by g2 ·2 w2, the diVerence
between the value of the trip of the marginal slow driver and her travel time. On the other
hand, the social surplus of the fast vehicles decreases and this decrease is equal to the
marginal external cost of slow vehicles. This marginal external cost is equal to z2 (see (8))
and equals the diVerence between the value of the supply curve and the travel time. Both
eVects therefore cancel out in situation (ii) where supply and demand cross. However, if
the number of slow vehicles increases, the positive eVect on the surplus of slow vehicles
becomes larger than the negative eVect on the surplus of the fast vehicles and total social
surplus increases. Similar reasoning shows that a decrease in the number of slow vehicles
from situation (ii) onwards will also increase total social surplus.
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The third possibility we have to consider is one in which the number of
slow vehicles is equal to 0, situation (iii). In this situation the marginal
external cost of slow vehicles is in®nitely high (see (11)), so increasing the
number of slow vehicles will at ®rst always decrease the social surplus as
long as g2 0 is ®nite (as we assume). Hence, situation (iii) is a local corner
maximum. The only way to show whether it is a global maximum as well is
by comparison with situation (i). If we denote the supply curve as s m2
and the number of slow vehicles in situation (i) as m , then we can write the
diVerence in social surplus between situations (iii) and (i) as:
SS iii SS i
…m
0
g2 m2 s m2 dm2: 12
The situation depicted is not the only possible one. In the case where
demand is linear, diVerent situations occur if the demand curve becomes
steeper. If the demand curve crosses the horizontal axis at low numbers of
slow drivers, the diVerence between equilibrium (i) and the situation
without tolling becomes more substantial. Moreover, equilibria (i) and (ii)
become closer to each other. However, it must be noted that, given the
characteristics of the ‘‘congestion technology’’ discussed above, such a
situation can only occur if demand for trips by slow vehicles is small even
at travel time zero. If the demand curve is very steep, no equilibrium with
Figure 5
‘‘Market equilibria’’ for slow drivers at various levels of inelastic demands of fast drivers
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tolling may exist, because the demand curve is everywhere below the
‘‘supply’’ curve. In this case a policy maker is only able to choose between
the user equilibrium and situation (iii).10
If the demand curve is non-linear, there may of course be more points
at which supply and demand curves cross and more candidates for a global
maximum. However, the supply curve is always very steep at extremely
low levels of demand of slow vehicles and almost horizontal for even
moderate levels of that demand. This suggests that in many cases a
situation such as (i) will correspond with a maximal social surplus. In such
a situation the optimum is very close to a fourth possibly optimal situa-
tion, namely one in which no policy measures are taken. Even small costs
associated with tolling will make this situation (iv) of laissez faire the real
optimum.
In conclusion, under the circumstances studied here, tolling does not
seem to be a very eVective policy if one wants to maximise social surplus.
If situation (i) is the optimum, even small costs associated with tolling
make it preferable to do nothing. If situation (iii) is the optimum, a
complete prohibition on slow vehicles from entering the road is the opti-
mal instrument.
A numerical example
Figure 5 was drawn on the assumption of a completely inelastic demand
for trips by fast vehicles, and we maintained that assumption throughout
the discussion of the previous subsection. If demand is elastic, the supply
curve for the slow vehicles can only be drawn on the basis of some
assumption on the number of fast vehicles. However, except for very low
levels of demand for trips by slow vehicles, these supply curves can hardly
be distinguished from each other and we do not expect much harm from
this tacit assumption. It may, nevertheless, be useful to provide a
numerical illustration for the more general case in which demand for trips
by fast vehicles is also elastic. We will not derive supply curves, but only
compare the four situations listed above.
We consider again the same road segment but now we suppose that the
inverse demand curves of both types of vehicles are linear. For simplicity,
the value of time is taken to be equal to 1 for both types of vehicles. The
intercept of the inverse demand curve of the fast and slow vehicles is
assumed to be equal to two hours. At the minimum travel time of l=s1
demand for trips by fast vehicles is taken to be equal to 1,000, demand for
10Between the cases of two equilibria with tolling and no equilibrium there is the special
case in which the two tolling equilibria coincide.
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trips by slow vehicles equals 500 if travel time is equal to l=s2. The
numerical results are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1
Four Situations
Number Number Travel Toll on Toll on
of Fast of Slow Time of Fast Slow
Vehicles Vehicles Fast Social Vehicles Vehicles
Per Hour Per Hour Vehicles Surplus (hrs) (hrs)
Situation m1 m2 w1 SS z1 z2
i Optimal tolling 977.97 499.27 0.1657 1355.6229 0.0006 0.0026
ii Suboptimal tolling 968.55 15.08 0.1396 919.4798 0.0132 1.7782
iii No slow vehicles 1000.00 0.00 0.1250 937.5000 - -
iv Laissez faire 978.32 500.00 0.1657 1355.6218 - -
Legend. ‘‘Optimal tolling 1’’ refers to optimal tolling at a high level of demand for trips by slow
vehicles, ‘‘Optimal tolling 2’’ to a low level .
Optimal tolling at a high level of demand for trips (i) by slow vehicles
implies hardly any diVerence with the situation of laissez faire (iv) in which
there are no measures for tra¤c control. In situation (i) the tolls are
negligible for both types of vehicles and they have hardly any in¯uence on
demand or social surplus.
In the second equilibrium with tolling (ii) the number of slow vehicles is
much smaller. Travel time for the fast vehicles decreases as a consequence,
but consumer surplus also falls considerably when compared to (i) and
(iv). The value of the toll for slow vehicles is high: the monetary equivalent
of 1.78 hours of time. The demand for trips by these vehicles falls to a level
as low as 15 per hour. Nevertheless, the in¯uence of these 15 vehicles on
the travel time of fast vehicles is substantial, as a comparison with the
situation without slow vehicles on the road makes clear.
The table shows that in the present situation complete abandoning of
slow vehicles (iii), which implies that toll revenues are zero, leads to a
higher social surplus than (ii) even though demand of fast vehicles is now
elastic.11 Situations (ii) and (iii) have a substantially lower social surplus
than (i) and (iv). Clearly, in the circumstances considered here, even the
slightest costs associated with tolling make laissez faire the preferred
alternative.
For other combinations of parameters the relative attractiveness of the
alternatives may be rather diVerent. For instance, when the demand for
11 If demand becomes more elastic examples can be constructed in which (ii) has a slightly
higher social surplus than (iii).
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slow tra¤c is much lower than that for fast tra¤c, the ‘‘no slow vehicles’’
alternative (iii) may easily perform better than the laissez faire alternative.
The reason is that the loss of consumer surplus by the slow groupÐwhen
it is excluded from the roadÐis much smaller than in the case of Table 1.
Note also that the marginal external costs of slow vehicles are very high
when there are only a few of them.
The discussion above proceeded on the assumption that vehicle types
can be easily identi®ed for the purpose of tolling. This is obviously the case
when special kinds of vehicle (agricultural vehicles, trucks) are the slow
ones, while private cars are the other. The situation becomes more di¤cult
if speed diVerences stem from characteristics of the vehicles or the drivers
that are not (or not easily) observable. For instance, if only heavily loaded
trucks have a low speed, whereas the others have a high speed, it may for
all practical purposes be impossible to select the group to be tolled. In such
a situation the eVectiveness of tolling is less than under the ®rst best
conditions assumed above.
Relevance
In reality we see in the Netherlands that in the countryside there is a dense
road network connecting all houses and farms where all kinds of tra¤c are
allowed. There is also a coarser network of better roads, connecting the
villages, where slow tra¤c (tractors, bicycles, and so on) is sometimes not
admitted.
The main motivation to separate slow and fast tra¤c in this situation
relates to safety (SWOV, 1990): speed diVerences are known to be an
important determinant of accidents. Our analysis reveals that this policy is
also supported by considerations of time losses and social welfare. As the
analysis given above indicates, routes with a very high demand of fast
tra¤c can probably best be used exclusively for fast tra¤c, while the
resulting welfare losses to slow tra¤c are moderate if there is a su¤ciently
dense network of other roads on which it is allowed.
Comparison with earlier work
The version of the model discussed in the present sectionÐwith a single
lane, without overtakingÐis among the scenarios considered in this paper
closest to the model we presented in Verhoef et al. (1999). The main
qualitative diVerence involves the consideration of stochastic arrival rates
here, as opposed to deterministic arrival rates in Verhoef et al. (1999). This
means that the model discussed in the present section allows us to assess
the impacts of the introduction of stochasticity in arrival rates alone upon
the properties of the model.
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In a qualitative sense, the main results of the present model are con-
sistent with those obtained with deterministic arrival rates. Also for that
model, the marginal external costs of slow vehicles are decreasing in their
equilibrium use level, and the marginal external costs of fast vehicles are
typically a small fraction of those caused by slow vehicles. Also in that
model fast vehicles’ equilibrium speeds are bounded between their own
preferred speed and that of the slow vehicles.
The main qualitative diVerence between the two formulations stems
from the fact that with deterministic arrival rates, a distinction can be
made between situations where fast vehicles will experience congestion
(that is, have to slow down) with a probability ( pc) smaller than unity,
and cases where this will occur with certainty ( pc 1). The resulting
‘regime shifts’ that may occur when varying equilibrium numbers of users
for either groups, as in Figures 1±5 just discussed (that is, when pc
changes between unity and below-unity), will cause the relevant curves to
show sharp kinks. Figure 1 in Verhoef et al. (1999) gives a clear example.
The most important consequence of this is that in a formulation with
deterministic arrival rates, marginal external costs for slow vehicles
exhibit a relatively ¯at segment for pc < 1, and start falling sharplyÐas in
Figure 4 in the present paperÐonly from pc 1 onwards. For fast cars,
the pattern is diVerent: there, the marginal external costs riseÐas in
Figure 3 in the present paperÐonly for pc < 1, and fall from pc 1
onwards, as the equilibrium speed for fast cars approaches its minimum
(the slow vehicles’ speed), and extra fast cars no longer aVect their own
speed. Apparently, in the present model, this latter eVect does not yet
occur for ¯ow levels (of fast cars) even near the maximum of 3,000
vehicles per hour (see Figure 3).
The formulation in the present paper has the practical advantage that
such regime shifts and kinks are avoided, and it probably better re¯ects
congestion in reality, for which of course it is typically not possible to
predict with certainty whether or not a slow vehicle will be encountered
during a trip.
Finally, as far as quantitative aspects are concerned, a quick check
revealed that the curves depicted in Figures 2 and 4 are very similar to
those that would be found with an equivalent model based on determi-
nistic arrivals (apart from the kinks just discussed). These are obviously
the most signi®cant curves from a policy perspective. For travel times and
marginal external costs as a function of the use level of fast cars, as in
Figures 1 and 3, the diVerences are relatively larger. Given the small size of
the externality involved, we will not investigate these diVerences further
here, but instead move on to consider an extension to the model in which a
second lane and overtaking possibilities are introduced.
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Two Lane Road, Overtaking Possible
In this section we analyse the changes that occur in the model of the
preceding section when we introduce the possibility of overtaking. We
consider a road with two lanes and tra¤c moving in opposite directions on
both lanes. Overtaking is possible if a su¤ciently large gap occurs in the
tra¤c moving in the opposite direction.
We assume that similar stochastic processes describe tra¤c on both
lanes, although some of the parameters may have diVerent values.
The minimum required length of a gap
A fast driver on the right lane who overtakes a slow driver has to be able to
use the left lane for the time needed to complete the overtaking. Overtaking
starts when the nose of the fast car is at the minimum distance d behind
the car in front. The fast driver switches to the left lane and overtakes the
slow car at the high speed s1.
12,13The fast driver moves back to the right
lane as soon as the nose of his car is at the minimum distance to the nose of
the slow car that is overtaken. We remove any problems caused by the
possibility that two slow vehicles are driving behind each other so closely as
to make it impossible to overtake them one by one.14The time needed for
overtaking is therefore equal to that of proceeding 2d metres at a speed
s1 s2: 2d = s1 s2 . During this time the fast driver travels
s12d = s1 s2 metres. If the ®rst oncoming car on the left lane has speed s3
it travels s32d = s1 s2 metres during the same time. The required length
of the gap in tra¤c on the left lane is therefore equal to:
g 2
s3 s1
s1 s2
d : 13
12 If the fast car was forced to slow down before overtaking started, speed switches to the
high value at the start of overtaking.
13 In reality overtaking often takes place at a higher speed in order to limit the duration of
the overtaking. In order to take this into account, we should introduce a third speed, the
one preferred during overtaking, into our model. However, in reality it seems also the
case that drivers do not switch back to the right lane as soon as possible as is assumed in
our model, but remain on the left lane somewhat longer. The two simplifying
assumptions used here may therefore be expected to compensate for each other to some
extent. Relaxing the assumption that drivers use the preferred speed during overtaking
would complicate the model and require us to deal with the extraordinarypossibility that
travel time of fast drivers decreases as a result of the presence of some slow vehicles
because of the higher speed they use during overtaking, which is probably of no practical
interest.
14This can be motivated by assuming that the last of these two slow vehicles will throttle
back in order to enable the overtaking car to move to the right, if this is necessary
because of oncoming tra¤c on the other side of the road.
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The speed s3 may be equal to s1 or s2, but may also be diVerent.
Some assumptions
In order to keep the model tractable, we introduce a number of assump-
tions that diVer from those made in the previous section.
. We assume that if the relationship between demand and arrival rates is
taken into account, as was done in equations (2) and (3), there is no
need to deal explicitly with interactions between fast vehicles that are
the result from platooning and so on. Previously this was a result
established in the Appendix. Here it is an assumption. It may be possible
to prove its validity also in the present situation, but we have not done
so.
. All cars on the left lane have the same speed s3. This allows us to derive
expressions for the probability that the length of a gap exceeds a certain
value, for the expected value of the time one has to wait until a
su¤ciently large gap occurs, and so on. Demand for trips on the left
lane is denoted as m3 and it is assumed that the same minimum distance
d has to be maintained between cars on that side of the road. The
arrival rate l3 is therefore equal to m3= 1 m3=c .
15
. We consider a steady state of tra¤c moving on a long road in which a
fast driver alternately drives at a high or a low speed. We therefore
adopt a special feature of the model of the previous section: all fast cars
that entered the road could proceed at the high speed when entering the
road.16
Average speed and average travel time
We now consider the average speed and travel time of a fast driver on the
right hand side of the road under the circumstances described above. His
experience is a sequence of events consisting of two parts:
. a period during which the high speed can be maintained that starts when
a slow car begins to be overtaken and ends when the distance to another
slow car is minimal, so that he has to slow down to s2;
15Although it would have been more satisfactory to treat tra¤c in both directions
symmetrically, this would also complicate our derivations considerably. The assumption
of homogeneous tra¤c is easier to use, and probably does not change the qualitative
results. The even simpler assumption of deterministic arrival rates on the left lane would
imply that it is either always possible or always impossible to overtake between two
subsequent cars, which is clearly not realistic.
16Note that the steady state in the model of the previous section is a situation in which all
fast cars are forced to slow down.
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. a period of driving at the low speed, until a su¤ciently large gap occurs
in tra¤c moving in the opposite direction.
The average speed A s of the fast driver is therefore equal to a
weighted average of the high and the low speed, with the weights equal to
the expected length of the periods during which both speeds are used.
Denoting these periods as j1 and j2, we can write:
A s
j1s1 j2s2
j1 j2
: 14
For the average travel time per unit of distance, A w we ®nd:
A w
1
A s
³ ´
j1 j2
j1s1 j2s2
15
In the Appendix the following expressions for j1 and j2 are derived:
j1 t1= 1 p1 ; with t1
d s2=l2
s1 s2
and p1 e l3
g=s3= d l3=s3 1 :
j2 t2=p2 with t2
1
s2 s3
d
s3
l3
g
e l3g=s3
1 e l3g=s3
³ ´
and p2 e l3
g=s3 :
Optimal tolls
For the marginal external costs the following equations can be derived
easily from the Lagrangean given in the appendix:
z1 m1v1
l @A w
@m1
;
z2 m1v1
l @A w
@m2
; 16
z3 m1v1
l @A w
@m3
:
We focus attention on the ®rst and second group of vehicles. Observe that
A w depends on m1 and m2 only through l2, while l2 appears only in j1.
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After some elaboration we ®nd:
@A w
@m1
j2s2
j1s1 j2s2
¡ ¢2 11 p1 1c 1m2 ;
@A w
@m2
j2s2
j1s1 j2s2
¡ ¢2 11 p1 c m1 m2m2 1
³ ´
1
c
1
m2
:
17
An example
As an example we take the same road segment as in the previous section
and apply our new assumptions. An alternative interpretation, that is
unrealistic but may nevertheless be helpful in interpreting the results, is to
imagine a circular road with a circumference of 10 kilometres where tra¤c
moves continuously. It is assumed in all ®gures that tra¤c on the left lane
has a speed of 60 km/hr. Figure 6 shows the travel time of fast vehicles as a
function of the demand of slow vehicles for various values of the demand
for trips on the left lane. If that demand is very low, there is no congestion
and travel time equals l=s1. If the number of cars on the left lane increases,
the travel time function takes on the concave shape discussed in the pre-
vious section. For very high tra¤c intensities on the left lane the travel
time curve becomes ¯at again, but now at the maximum value 1=s2. In
Figure 6
The relationship between travel time of fast vehicles and the number of slow vehicles on the right lane
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contrast with the model of the previous section, travel time of fast vehicles
will ultimately be equal to l=s2 for every positive value of the demand for
trips by slow vehicles. This is a consequence of our steady-state assump-
tion: if overtaking is impossible and there are slow vehicles on the road,
every fast driver will ultimately be forced to slow down.
Although the assumptions that underlie both ®gures are somewhat
diVerent, we can get some idea of the eVect of introducing the possibility
of overtaking when we compare Figures 6 and 2. Figure 2 showed that the
presence of even a small number of slow vehicles increased travel time of
the fast vehicles considerably. In Figure 6 we ®nd that travel time of fast
vehicles remains close to its minimum value, even in the presence of a large
number of slow vehicles, as long as tra¤c intensity on the left lane is low.
If there is much tra¤c on the left lane the possibilities for overtaking
disappear and the resulting situation is similar to that studied in the
previous section.
Note that most of the lines drawn in Figure 6 are strictly concave and
the others are straight lines. This suggests of course that optimal tolls will
in the present circumstances also be decreasing for small volumes of
demand for trips by slow vehicles and almost equal to zero for higher
levels of demand. Figure 7 con®rms this conjecture (note that the scale of
the horizontal axis diVers from that of Figure 6).
Figure 7
The relationship between the marginal external cost of slow vehicles and the number of slow vehicles on
the right lane
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As noted above, a special feature of the model of this section is that the
travel time function becomes ¯at if there are many cars on the left lane.
This makes one expect that optimal tolls become ¯at for high tra¤c
intensities on the left lane. Figure 7 con®rms this: if there are 1,500 cars per
hour on the left lane, the marginal external cost is (much) lower than if
there are 1,250 cars per hour. If the number of cars on the left lane
increases to still higher values, optimal tolls are negligible even for
extremely low numbers of slow vehicles.
External eVects of tra¤c moving in the opposite direction
In Figure 8 we look at the relation between the number of vehicles per
hour on the left lane and the travel time of fast vehicles on the right lane.
The curves drawn refer to various numbers of vehicles per hour on the
right line. In all cases the number of slow vehicles is one-third of this total,
the others are fast vehicles. As before, we assume that all vehicles on the
left lane drive at 60 km/hr.
For very small tra¤c intensities on the right lane the travel time of fast
vehicles on the right lane is almost equal to its minimum until tra¤c on the
Figure 8
The relationship between travel time of fast vehicles on the right lane and the number of vehicles on the
left lane
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left lane becomes so intense that overtaking becomes impossible. Then it
increases rapidly to the maximum travel time (remember the steady state
context of the present model). For higher volumes of tra¤c on the right
lane the curves start to increase earlier and approach the maximum value
gradually.
The marginal external cost imposed by vehicles on the left lane on
vehicles on the right lane is shown in Figure 9. This ®gure has been
constructed on the basis of numerical diVerentiation. (Analytical meth-
ods can be used to calculate the third of equations (16) but imply tedious
derivations.) Note that the curves shown in Figure 9 refer to the slope of
the corresponding line in Figure 8, multiplied by m1, the number of fast
vehicles on the right side of the road.17 That is the reason why the
marginal external costs are always virtually equal to zero when the
number of fast vehicles on the right side equals 1, even though the travel
time of this single vehicle increases rapidly when the number of vehicles
on the left side is approximately 1,300, as shown by the corresponding
line in Figure 8.
For larger numbers of vehicles on the right lane, marginal external
costs of tra¤c on the left lane become larger, even though the cor-
Figure 9
The relationship between the marginal external cost of vehicles on the left lane and their number
17See the third of equations 16.
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responding curves in Figure 8 are less steep. For 500 vehicles per hour
on the right lane, the marginal external cost reaches a maximum when
there are approximately 600 cars per hour on the left lane. Compar-
ison with Figure 8 makes it clear that the travel time of fast drivers in
the right lane increases rapidly at that level of demand on the left
lane.
At higher levels of tra¤c demand on the right lane, external costs of
cars on the left hand side are more substantial and the number of cars on
the left lane for which marginal external costs are maximal shifts to the
origin. Figure 9 shows that for 2,000 and 2,950 cars on the right lane the
marginal external costs of vehicles on the left lane are a decreasing func-
tion of their number.
Relevance
We conclude that introducing the possibility of overtaking does not
change the essence of the conclusions we drew in the previous section.
Tolling of slow vehicles does not seem to be a promising policy since,
depending on the number of slow vehicles, the alternatives laissez faire and
‘‘no slow vehicles’’ are probably almost as good in terms of total welfare
and are much easier to implement.
However, there is an additional element in the model where overtaking
is allowed: vehicles on the left lane generate external costs on the fast
vehicles on the right lane because they hinder overtaking. Figure 9 shows
that only when the right lane is very busy and the left lane is very quiet, are
the marginal external costs of the left lane vehicles considerable. This
suggests that only in this case does it make sense to impose a toll on users
of the left lane. However, if the number of vehicles on the left lane is small,
the policy of not allowing them to enter the lane would yield a welfare
result that is not far from imposing an optimal toll and clearly better than
the laissez faire alternative.
A real world example that looks like this situation is the morning peak
with large tra¤c ¯ows in one direction and small ¯ows in the other. The
instrument of switch lanes (used for tra¤c in one direction during the
morning peak and for tra¤c in the other direction during the afternoon
peak) comes close to this outcome of allocating road capacity exclusively
for vehicles in one direction.
Another obvious conclusion that follows from the analysis is that
imposition of a ban on overtaking leads to very small time losses when
tra¤c is heavy in both directions, whereas the gains in terms of improved
safety (not addressed in this paper) may be substantial.
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Conclusions
In this paper we analysed congestion caused by speed diVerences in
situations where two groups of vehicles with diVerent preferred speeds use
a single lane. This relatively simple situation allowed us to develop a
structural model of this type of congestion. Our main result is that this
model indicates that the relationship between marginal external costs and
numbers of vehicles are very diVerent from the increasing convex curves
familiar from the Pigou±Knight analysis. In Section 2 we considered the
case in which overtaking is impossible and found that marginal external
costs of slow vehicles are a decreasing function of their number, while
optimal tolls for this group are virtually zero, unless their number is small.
Clearly tolling is not a very useful policy in this situation. We suggested
that the actual policy, which prohibits slow tra¤c entering some primary
roads, while allowing all kinds of tra¤c on a denser network of secondary
roads, might be optimal.
In Section 3 we found that introduction of the possibility of overtaking
changes some aspects of the model, but not the downward sloping rela-
tionship between the marginal external costs of slow vehicles and their
number. Moreover, we found that the relationship between marginal
external cost and the number of vehicles on the left lane is only mono-
tonous when the number of vehicles on the right lane is close to the
capacity of that lane. Then we ®nd again that these costs are a decreasing
function of the number of cars. For lower numbers of vehicles on the
right side, we ®nd that these marginal external costs are initially
increasing.
Since our analysis makes use of numerical simulations, we have car-
ried out sensitivity analyses by changing the values of key variables
namely the desired speeds and the minimum required distance. In all
cases the results were qualitatively the same as those reported in the
text.18
A main conclusion that can be drawn from our analyses is that
tolling slow vehicles tends to have rather small eVects on total welfare.
Depending on the number of slow vehicles, the alternatives laissez faire
or ‘‘no slow vehicles’’ are almost as good in terms of total welfare and
18The original values of these parameters were chosen deliberately so as to represent a road
that may be thought of as connecting two villages in a rural area, and the alternative
values of the parameters were chosen so as to maintain the possibility of this
interpretation. The diVerences between the alternative values and the ones used
originally was therefore limited (for speeds the maximum diVerence was 20 km/hr, for
the distance between cars 10 metres).
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probably better if the costs of implementation are also taken into
account. It may also be noted that we have tacitly assumed that it
would be possible to toll the two groups of vehicles diVerently, which
requires that a policy maker should be able to identify these groups (for
instance, on the basis of observable characteristics). If this assumption
is false, it will be even more di¤cult to improve welfare by means of
tolling.
Although our results refer to a special and simpli®ed situation, they are
nevertheless interesting because they suggest that it may be quite worth-
while to develop a more structural analysis of congestion and the appro-
priate policy instruments to deal with it. Especially in situations where
congestion is not related to the existence of a bottleneck (for this situation
a well-developed structural model exists), this may result in new insights.
The traditional Pigou±Knight analysis which is commonly used as a kind
of benchmark model for thinking about congestion in such situations
suggests a relationship that turns out to be quite diVerent from the one
studied in this paper.
Finally, we would like to stress that our analysis does not refer to a
theoretical curiosity, but is likely to have policy relevance. Our examples
were constructed so as to resemble the tra¤c situation on roads (not
highways) outside the main cities in the Netherlands, which is probably
close to that in comparable areas in most other advanced economies.
Congestion caused by speed diVerences may also occur because of
interaction between various tra¤c modes. A typically Dutch example
would be the interaction between cyclists and motor vehicles. In the
Netherlands the (parts of) the infrastructure used by cars and cyclists are
often separated, but in other countries interaction between cars and
slower tra¤c modes seems to be an important source of congestion,
especially in large cities.
The analysis of speed diVerences may also be relevant in situations that
are diVerent from the one discussed in the present paper. For instance,
Newell’s (1998) analysis of a moving bottleneck suggests a study of the
welfare economic eVects of congestion caused by speed diVerences on a
highway where two (or more) types of vehicles use two lanes that are
exclusively used for tra¤c in one direction. If the capacity of one lane is
insu¤cient for allowing the fast vehicles to overtake the slow ones, there
will be queueing behind the slow vehicles. If there are three types of vehicle
with diVerent preferred speeds, congestion occurs also when a vehicle with
medium speed overtakes one with a slow speed and thereby forces a
vehicle with a high speed to slow down.
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Appendix
Expected travel time for fast vehicles when overtaking is impossible
We start the analysis by introducing an additional simplifying assumption,
which will be dropped later on. The assumption states that all cars can be
considered as points (that is, do not occupy road space) and can approach
each other inde®nitely close.
Consider a fast driver who enters the road and let t be the time that
elapsed since the last slow driver before him entered the road segment.
This slow car has therefore travelled s2t kilometres when the fast driver
enters. The distance between the fast and the slow driver will start to
decrease immediately and after s2t= s1 s2 time units it is equal to zero.
The fast car will then have travelled s1s2t= s1 s2 kilometres. If this
number exceeds the length of the road l the fast car will not experience
congestion. Total travel time w is then equal to l=s1: The critical value for t
can be derived as l s1 s2 =s1s2 l=s2 l=s1:
If t is smaller than this critical value, the fast car will be forced to move
at a low speed for the last l ts1s2= s1 s2 kilometres of the road. Total
travel time can then be computed as:
w
1
s1
s1s2
s1 s2
t
1
s2
l
s1s2
s1 s2
t
³ ´
;
l
s2
t:
A standard result from the theory of Poisson processes says that t is
distributed exponentially with parameter l2: It should be recalled that this
refers only to the case with t below the critical value.
If X is a random variable with an exponential distribution (with
parameter l) that is truncated at k, its expected value can be derived as
follows:
E X
…k
0
lxe lx dx k Prob X > k ;
e lklk e lk 1
l
ke lk;
1 e lk
l
:
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The expected value of travel time for a fast driver is:
E w
l
s2
E t ;
l
s2
1
l2
1 e l2 1=s2 1=s1
¡ ¢
The second line results from application of the formula derived above to
the case with X t, l l2 and k l=s2 l=s1.
Now we drop the assumption that cars do not occupy any space and
assume that a distance d between (the noses of) subsequent cars is always
maintained. This results in two complications:
. a Poisson process is no longer suitable as a model for arrivals since it
implies that two cars can enter at (almost) the same time;
. the number of fast cars between an arbitrary fast car and the ®rst slow
car in front of it becomes of importance, since it determines the location
where the fast car has to switch to the speed.
Arrival of cars is now modelled as a source that can be on and oV. If
the source is on, a car arrives after a time that is distributed exponentially
with parameter l1 l2. After a car arrives, the source will be oV for d =s2
times units. This guarantees that the ®rst d metres of the road are always
free if the source is on. (It is possible to change this second characteristic in
such a way that the source will be oV for a smaller length of time until a
fast car arrives, but this complicates the derivations and adds nothing
signi®cant to the analysis.)
Now consider a fast car that is entering the road. In order to determine
the location where speed has to switch to the lower value, notice the
following facts:
. the number of fast cars that entered the road after the last slow car that
entered plus that slow car itself is distributed geometrically with
parameter l2= l1 l2 : call this number K ;
. if K k, then the distance between the fast car and the slow car at the
moment the former has to switch to the low speed is kd ;
. The random variable Ki 1Xi, with the Xi ’s mutually independent
exponentially distributed with parameter l, and K geometrically
distributed with parameter p, is exponentially distributed with
parameter lp.
We now determine the location of the slow car, conditional upon
K k. This location is s2T with T the elapsed time since the slow car
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entered the road. Conditional upon K k we have:
T X1 d =s2 X2 d =s2 Xk d =s2;
kd =s2
Xk
i 1
Xi:
This equation expresses the fact that the time between subsequent starts
equals d =s2 Xi, where Xi is distributed exponentially with parameter
l1 l2 . The location L of the slow car is therefore:
L s2T kd s2
Xk
i 1
Xi:
Making use of the second fact, we know that the fast car has to reduce
speed when the distance to the preceding slow car equals kd . The time
during which the fast speed can be maintained is therefore equal to the
time it takes to reduce the distance to the slow car by s2 Xi Ts metres.
This time is equal to:
Ts
s2
s1 s2
Xk
i 1
Xi:
Now use the third fact, with l l1 l2 and p l2= l1 l2 . This
implies:
Ts
s2
s1 s2
Xk
i 1
Ts ;
with Ts distributed exponentially with parameter l2. Notice that this
derivation is still conditional upon k.
In order to complete the derivation of the distribution of the travel time
of the fast car, one additional assumption has to be made. If the slow car
in front of the fast cars leaves the road, which speed will the fast cars
immediately behind it use until they leave the road? We assume that they
maintain the low speed s2. We now complete the derivation by observing
that during the ®rst Ts time units the car has speed s1, while during the
remaining time units speed will be s2. The distance travelled after Ts time
units is s1s2 = s1 s2 T s kilometres. If this is larger than l, travel time is
l=s1, otherwise l s1s2 = s1 s2 Ts kilometres have to be travelled with
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speed s2. Analogous to the derivation under the simpli®ed assumptions,
the following conclusions may be drawn:
a
W
l
s1
if
s1s2
s1 s2
T s > l;
l
s2
T s otherwise
(b) W has the same distribution function as l=s2 Z, with Z an expo-
nentially distributed distribution which is truncated at s1 s2 l= s1s2 .
In other words the distribution of W is equal to that derived under the
earlier simplifying assumption. This could have been conjectured already
because of the cancellation of the two complicating factors in the formula
for Ts : the random variable K does not appear in it. The expected value
for W may therefore be written as:
w1 E W
l
s2
1
l2
1 exp l2
l
s2
l
s1
³ ´³ ´³ ´
and this is equation (6) of the main text.
Before concluding this part of the appendix we observe some less
obvious properties of this function.
c
lim
l2 0
w1
l
s2
lim
l2 0
1 exp l2
l
s2
l
s1
³ ´³ ´
l2
l
s2
lim
l2 0
exp l2
l
s2
l
s1
³ ´³ ´
l
s2
l
s1
³ ´
l
s1
(the second line makes use of l’Hopital’s rule).
(d) w1 is increasing in l2. This should of course be expected, but it is not
completely obvious from the equation. The ®rst-order derivative is:
@E1 w
@l2
1
l22
1 1 l2A e l2A
¡ ¢
with A l=s2 l=s1. We have to show that this is positive. Observe
that for l2 0, the expression in brackets is positive. Computation of
the relevant partial derivative of the expression in brackets shows that
it is increasing in l2. Thus we conclude that @E1 w =@l2 is positive for
positive values of l2. It follows that @E1 w =@l2 is always positive for
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l2non-negative. Moreover, it can be shown that:
lim
l2 0
@E w
@l2
1
2
l
s1
l
s2
³ ´2
;
which is also positive.
(e) w1 is a concave function of l2. The second order derivative of w1 is:
@2E w1
@l22
1
l32
1 1 l2A e l2A l
2
2A
2e l2A
© ª
:
The expression between curled brackets is positive. The sum of the ®rst
two terms has been shown to be positive when determining the sign of
@E1 w =@l2 and the third term is clearly also positive.
Optimal tolls
In order to derive the optimal tolls, we maximise the sum of the consumer
surpluses of the two groups of vehicles, plus the toll revenues under the
side conditions that the generalised travel costs are equal to the sum of
time costs and toll at the optimum.
The Lagrangian is:
L
…m1
0
g m1 dm1 v1w1m1
…m2
0
g2 m2 dm2 v2w2m2
Z1 g1 m1 v1w1 z1 Z2 g2 m2 v2w2 z2 d1m1 d2m2;
where the last two terms refer to the constraints that both m1 and m2 should
be non-negative. If demand of both fast and slow vehicles is positive, the
two d-s are zero, and the solution given in the text (10) can be obtained
easily.
In order to analyse the possibility that one or both demands are zero at
the optimum, observe:
. that the sum of the consumer surpluses will be zero when both demands
are zero, which is never optimal as long as (at least) one of the two
surpluses is positive with both tolls equal to zero;
. that it can never be optimal to set demand by fast vehicles equal to zero
if g1 0 > l=s2, since the presence of fast vehicles do not cause congestion
for slow vehicles.
This implies that in the situation in which g1 0 > l=s2 and g2 0 > l=s2
(that is, both surpluses are positive in a situation without tolling), the only
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possible corner solution is the one in which demand by slow vehicles
equals zero.
In such a situation there will be no congestion for the fast vehicles,
which implies that their toll equals 0. The toll for slow vehicles is so high as
to imply w2 z2 > g2 0 :
Since in practice the travel time for fast vehicles becomes close to w2 if
slow vehicles are allowed to drive on the road, what the foregoing
essentially implies is that there is a choice between two equilibria:
(a) an equilibrium in which both fast and slow vehicles are permitted to
enter the road, and travel times for both are practically equal to
w2 l=s2, while tolls are practically equal to zero,
(b) an equilibrium in which only fast vehicles are permitted to enter the
road, and their travel time equals l=s1, while slow vehicles do not enter
the road because of a prohibitively high toll.
For the computation of the ®rst partial derivative, @E1 w =@l2, we use
equation (6). The result can be written as:
@E1 w
@l2
1
l22
1 1 l2A e l2A
¡ ¢
;
with A l=s2 l=s1. Note that the partial derivative @E1 w =@l2 depends
on demand from both fast and slow vehicles through the arrival rate l2.
We use equation (4) in order to compute the other two derivatives that
we need:
@l2
@m1
m2
c
1
1
m1 m2
c
± ²± ²2 ;
@l2
@m2
@l2
@m1
1
c m1 m2
m2
³ ´
:
These derivatives have been written in this particular way in order to show
clearly that the toll for slow vehicles is always larger than that for the fast
vehicles, and especially so in situations in which the road is not heavily used
c m1 m2 is large) and demand for trips from slow vehicles ( m2) is low.
Derivations for the situation with overtaking
In this part of the appendix we derive expressions for j1 and j2, the
expected values of the periods during which the high and low speeds are
used. We start with j1.
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If a slow car is overtaken, the fast driver drives a distance of at least
2d at the high speed. The distance between two slow cars is exponentially
distributed with parameter l2=s2. The expected value of this distance is
therefore s2=l2. Note also that the fast car that overtakes a slow car uses
already d units of this distance as soon as overtaking is completed.19The
distance that can be travelled at the high speed before another slow car has
to be overtaken or speed has to be reduced is therefore on average equal to
d s2=l2. The time involved for the fast driver will be denoted as t1:
t1
d s2=l2
s1 s2
:
If the distance to the next slow car becomes minimal, the high speed can
only be maintained if overtaking can start immediately. We therefore have
to determine the probability p1 that there is a su¤ciently large gap in
tra¤c on the left lane at the moment the fast driver needs to start over-
taking. To do so, ®rst observe that overtaking can never take place if there
is another car present on the left lane at the location where overtaking
must start. The probability that such a situation occurs is equal to
d = d s3=l3 .
20 If no car is present at the location on the left lane
where overtaking has to start, the distance to the ®rst car on the left lane
has to be equal to or greater than g. The probability that this is the case
equals exp l3g=s3 . We therefore ®nd:
p1 1
d
d s3=l3
³ ´
e l3g=s3;
e l3g=s3= d l3=s3 1 :
Finally, we have to take into account that the total length of the period
during which the high speed can be maintained is a multiple of (sub)-
periods with expected duration t1:
j1 t1 1 p1 2t1p1 1 p1 3t1p
2
1 1 p1 ;
19We ignore complications that may arise from the possibility that two slow cars are so
close to each other that overtaking them one by one is impossible.We simply assume that
the last of these slow cars throttles back in order to give the overtaking car enough
distance to remove to the right lane if this is necessary and moves back to the original
position behind the ®rst of the two slow cars as soon as possible.
20The length of a car has here been taken to be equal to d .
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and this can be elaborated as follows:
j1 t1 1 p1
X
i 0
X
j i
p j1
t1 1 p1
X
i 0
pi1= 1 p1
t1= 1 p1 :
We move on to the derivation of j2. Such a period starts when a fast
car is forced to slow down. Immediate overtaking may be impossible,
either because the left hand side is occupied by a car moving in the
opposite direction, or because a car on the left lane is within distance g. In
the ®rst case, the expected value of the time until a gap occurs on the left
lane equals d =2 s2 s3 , which is small, and we ignore this part of the
total delay in what follows.
If a car is approaching on the left lane within distance g, the expected
time until it passes the fast driver who is forced to slow down on the right
lane is equal to E x x < g = s2 s3 . We elaborate the expected value:
E x x < g s3
„ g=s3
0
xl3e l3x dx„ g=s3
0 l3e
l3x dx
;
s3
1=l3 1 1 l3g=s3 e l3g=s3
¡ ¢
1 e l3g=s3
;
s3
l3
g
e l3g=s3
1 e l3g=s3
:
If it is taken into account that the fast driver also has to wait until the
oncoming car has passed, we can write down the expected value of the
time t2 it takes until the ®rst oncoming car is passed and overtaking may
become possible:
t2
1
s2 s3
d
s3
l3
g
e l3g=s3
1 e l3g=s3
³ ´
:
The probability p2 that the gap that follows the ®rst oncoming car will be
at least equal to g equals:
p2 e l3
g=s3 :
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The expected value j2 of the period during which speed has to be equal to
s2 can now be written as:
j2 t2p2 2t2 1 p2 p2 3t3 1 p2
2p2 ;
and this can be elaborated to:
j2 t2=p2:
In order to show that the expression for the expected values of speed and
travel time are appropriate, call t1 the time during which speed s1 can be
maintained and t2 the time during which the lower speed s2 is relevant. Let
n be the number of events. The total number of kilometres driven during n
events is:
s1
Xn
i 1
t i1 s2
Xn
i 1
t i2; i
whereas the total time this takes is:
Xn
i 1
t i1
Xn
i 1
t i2: ii
Average speed equals the ratio of (i) and (ii), and if numerator and
denominator are both divided by the number of events n, we ®nd the
following expression for average speed:
s1
Pn
i 1 t
i
1=n
¡ ¢
s2
Pn
i 1 t
i
2=n
¡ ¢Pn
i 1 t
i
1=n
¡ ¢ Pn
i 1 t
i
2=n
¡ ¢ : iii
Now observe that:
lim
n
Xn
i 1
t i1=n j1; limn
Xn
i 1
t i2=n j2;
and the result for A s follows by taking the limit of (iii) for n The
result for A w is derived similarly from the expression for the ratio of the
total time spent travelling during n events and the number of kilometres
driven, that is, the inverse of (iii).
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Optimal tolls when overtaking is possible
Again, we maximise social surplus. Now we have three groups of vehicles.
The Lagrangean is:
L
X3
i 1
…m1
0
gi mi dmi viwimi Zi g mi viwi zi
¡ ¢
(where we ignore the non-negativity constraints).
The travel times of the vehicles belonging to groups 2 and 3 are con-
stant. The travel time of vehicles belonging to group 1 is equal to
w1 lA w (see equation (15) of the main text) with l the length of the
road. Hence w1 is a function of the arrival rates l2 and l3 and, through
them, of the demands m1, m2 and m3.
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